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Abstract: The aim of this study was to investigate whether dopamine levels (as measured by the 
spontaneous eye blink) correlate to novelty seeking and whether dopamine and novelty seeking 
moderate performance on a cognitive flexibility task. While we found an effect of task condition, 




Slide 1: Bethany 
Hi everyone, today we’re going to discuss our research findings for our project on the 
relationship between dopamine, novelty seeking, and cognitive flexibility. 
 
Slide 2: Bethany 
Suppose you ask someone to sort a deck of cards by suit then afterwards ask them to sort the 
cards again, this time by color. Do you think they would be able to easily switch from the first 
task to the second? Well, some people would be better at it than others. One thing that would 
make people differ in their ability to switch from the first task to the second is cognitive 
flexibility, one of the variables we are interested in.  
 
Slide 3: Bethany 
Cognitive flexibility is the ability to adapt behavior in response to novel information or goals.  
In the card sorting example I used earlier, cognitively flexible individuals would easily be able to 
switch from sorting by suit to sorting by color, whereas less cognitively flexible individuals 
might have more trouble with this switch.  
 
Slide 4: Bethany 
Cognitive flexibility has been studied in the laboratory using the task switching paradigm 
developed by Dreisbach and Goschke, in which participants are presented with two different 
colored figures. They are trained to respond to a certain color then are told to respond to another 
color after a rule change.  
 
There were several conditions to this paradigm. In the Learned Irrelevance condition as shown 
on the left, the distractor color during training -yellow- becomes the target color after the rule 
change and the new distractor is a novel color -black-. So after the switch, they have to now 
respond to the stimuli they had previously ignored.  
 
In the perseveration condition as shown on the right, the target color during training - orange - 
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becomes the distractor color after the rule change. If a person perseverates, they would continue 
to choose the old target color instead of the new target with a novel color.  
  
Performance on the task was assessed by comparing switch cost across conditions, switch cost 
being the difference in reaction time between the pre and post-switch trials. A high switch cost 
would indicate a large difference between the pre-switch and post-switch trials, and a low switch 
cost would indicate little difference between them. Participants who had lower switch cost in the 
perseveration condition and higher switch cost in the learned irrelevance condition were deemed 
high in cognitive flexibility.  
 
Slide 5: Bethany                                         
Dopamine is a neurotransmitter involved in learning, updating working memory, and attentional 
control. Learning happens through reinforcement; updating working memory goes along with 
updating mental goals and keeping your current goal in mind; and attentional control is the 
ability to either MAINTAIN or SWITCH your attentional focus to task-relevant stimuli.  
 
As cognitive flexibility determines one’s ability to switch attention from one goal to another, it 
should come as no surprise that being high or low in dopamine can influence one’s cognitive 
flexibility, given dopamine’s role in attentional control and working memory.  
 
Dreisbach et al. found that people with high dopamine levels were more cognitively flexible. 
More specifically, they found that those with high dopaminergic activity performed better on the 
perseveration condition than those with lower activity, meaning they were more easily able to 
switch to a new rule. However, higher cognitive flexibility comes with higher distractibility, a 
possible reason why those with high dopamine also performed worse on the learned irrelevance 
condition because they struggled to endorse a target that had previously been a distractor. 
 
Slide 6: Haley D. 
There are two hypotheses for why participants high in dopamine perform the way they do in the 
task. 
 
The first is that dopamine creates a novelty bias. This suggests that those participants are better 
at the perseveration condition because the target’s novelty makes it more attention-grabbing than 
the distractor. On the flip side, they perform worse in the learned irrelevance condition because 
the distractor is novel, so the distractor is attracting their attention. 
 
The other hypothesis is that dopamine enhances distractor suppression, and this suggests that 
participants high in dopamine are better at the perseveration condition because the post-switch 
target was not a pre-switch distractor, so attention to it is not being suppressed. In the learned 
irrelevance condition, it’s the opposite. They make more mistakes because the new target was the 
old distractor they learned to ignore and they’re carrying over that residual distractor 
suppression.  
 
So, novelty bias says they’ll do well when the target is novel. Distractor suppression says they’ll 
do well the target has never been a distractor. And a difficulty with these hypotheses is that so far 
the literature hasn’t been able to distinguish between the two.  
 
Slide 7: Haley D.  
Now, the novelty bias hypothesis has some support in that higher levels of dopamine have been 
shown to increase behaviors that reflect a preference for novel stimuli.  
This preference shows up in novelty seeking, which is a personality trait that’s characterized by 
risk-taking and approach behaviors which are motivated by a desire for intense, novel, and 
rewarding experiences.  
 
The evidence that increasing dopamine levels increases novelty seeking implies that those 
participants high in dopamine will show a strong preference, or bias, for novelty. 
 
Slide 8: Haley D.  
There were three questions from Dreisbach et al.’s experiment that we wanted to answer. The 
first thing we wanted to know was: do novelty seeking and individual differences in dopamine 
correlate with one another?  
 
We hypothesized that yes they will correlate; participants who score highly in novelty seeking 
should also score highly in dopamine levels. 
 
Slide 9: Haley D.  
The second question we wanted to investigate was: do novelty seeking and dopamine moderate 
performance on cognitive flexibility tasks?  
 
We hypothesized that they do and we would see this as high dopamine and high novelty seeking 
correlating positively with high cognitive flexibility.  
 
High cognitive flexibility of course would be recognized as faster post-switch reaction times 
(meaning better performance) in the perseveration condition and slower post-switch reaction 
times (meaning worse performance) in the learned irrelevance condition.  
 
Slide 10: Haley D.  
The last question we wanted to answer was: Are the performance patterns of cognitively flexible 
individuals better explained by the idea that dopamine creates a novelty bias or that dopamine 
enhances distractor suppression?  
 
Following Dreisbach et al.’s suggestion, we addressed this question by supplementing the 
perseveration and learned irrelevance conditions with a new control condition. In this third 
condition, all of the stimuli (distractors and targets) would be novel. 
 
We had a two-part hypothesis for how performance across the three conditions might help us 
differentiate between novelty bias and distractor suppression.  
 
If the high-dopamine participants’ performance in the control condition was worse than 
perseveration but better than learned irrelevance, then we could assume that they have a novelty 
bias. They get middling scores in the control because both distractor and target are novel and 
equally attention-grabbing. 
 
Alternatively, if those participants performed best in the control condition, then we could assume 
that they have enhanced distractor suppression. They get better scores in the control because 
neither the distractor nor the target have fulfilled previous roles, so there’s no residual learning to 
struggle against.  
 
Slide 11: Haley T. 
In order to test these hypotheses, we ran a total of 54 participants, but dropped 4 because of 
unusable data and 1 because they did not meet the restrictions, so we analyzed the data of the 
remaining 49 participants. The Mean age of participants was 20.4 with a range of 18 to 48. As 
you can see, our participants were mostly female, freshmen, and caucasion. Participants were 
asked to not take part in this study if they had uncorrected vision problems; had a diagnosed 
neurological, psychiatric, or sleep disorder; had consumed caffeine or alcohol within 5 hours of 
the study; or used THC or nicotine more than twice a week. Participants were run between the 
hours of 9am to 5pm. These restrictions were put in place to avoid impacts on baseline dopamine 
levels.  
 
Slide 12: Haley T. 
To measure baseline dopamine levels, we looked at a person’s spontaneous eye blink rate (EBR), 
the number of times someone blinks naturally.  
 
This measure is supported by studies that have found that dopamine is highly correlated to eye 
blink rate. For example, studies have found that dopamine agonists increase EBR and that 
dopamine antagonists decrease it. 
 
We used electrooculography (EOG) to measure eye blink rate. To do this, Electrodes were 
placed in a vertical channel three centimeters above and two centimeters below the left eye and 
one in the center of the forehead which served as a baseline. Using the primary gaze paradigm, 
participants were told to sit down and stare at a dot on the computer screen for 5 minutes, as seen 
in the picture above.  
 
Slide 13: Haley T. 
In the literature, a blink is typically defined as between 100 and 400 milliseconds, and greater 
than 100 millivolts. Due to limitations in accessing the software to analyze the blink data during 
remote analysis, we had to visually identify the blinks based on our knowledge of what the 
typical blink looks like. To analyze the data, we counted how many times the participants 
blinked per minute, which we averaged across a five minute recording. On the right side you can 
see some examples of blink data. On the top is an example of high blink rate, and on the bottom 
is an example of low blink rate.  
 
Slide 14: Haley T. 
In order to measure Novelty Seeking, we gave the participants the TCI-R (Revised Temperament 
Character Inventory). The TCI-R short form includes 140 questions on a 1-5 Likert scale. While 
it measures seven subscales, we focused on the novelty seeking subscale. An example of a 
question the participants were given is “I often try new things just for fun or thrills.”  
 
Slide 15: Haley T. 
To measure cognitive flexibility, we replicated the attentional set shifting task Dreisbach used in 
the 2004 study. In this task, participants were shown two figures in different colors and asked to 
press a computer key to categorize it. These figures were either numbers, letters, or symbols. For 
example, the first slide tells participants that their target color is red and to categorize the red 
letters into either a vowel or consonant. In the second slide, participants pressed one key if the 
red letter was a vowel and another if it was a consonant.  
 
After 20 trials, the slide tells participants that their target color has switched to green so that 
participants will now categorize the green letter into a consonant or vowel.  
 
By looking at the switch cost, which is the difference in reaction time between the training trials 
and post-switch trials, we were able to see how easily the participants were able to switch 
between rules. The set-shifting task had three conditions: learned irrelevance, perseveration, and 
control.  
 
Slide 16: Haley T. 
In the learned irrelevance condition, the distractor color--in this case, yellow--becomes the target 
color after the switch, and the new distractor is a novel color. Following the switch, participants 
must pay attention to the color they were previously instructed to ignore and ignore the novel 
color instead.  
 
Slide 17: Haley T. 
In the perseveration condition, the target color during training--in this case, orange--becomes the 
distractor color after the switch, and the new target color is novel. Following the switch, 
participants must pay attention to a novel color and ignore the previous target color. 
 
Slide 18: Haley T. 
In the control condition, both colors post-switch are novel colors that are not used during the 
training trials. As mentioned previously, adding the control condition to Dreisbach's original 
paradigm allows us to better determine whether their findings were due to novelty seeking or 
distractor suppression.  
 
Slide 19: Maddox 
To prepare the data from the cognitive flexibility task before analysis, we removed all trials 
where participants responded with the wrong key from our data. We found that on average, 
participants responded incorrectly to 4.18% of the trials.  
 
We also removed all trials where participants took longer than 2000 ms to respond. This 
accounted for 1.999% of trials. 
 
We prepared our novelty seeking and blink data by performing a median split to determine high 
vs. low categories for these variables. 
 
Slide 20: Maddox 
In order to address our first question --do novelty seeking and individual differences in dopamine 
correlate with one another? -- we ran a bivariate correlation of these two variables. 
We hypothesized that these two variables would be positively related to one another. Our 
analysis did not yield a significant correlation between dopamine and novelty seeking; however, 
the result was in the same direction that we initially predicted and it was fairly close to 
significant. Low power due to a small sample size likely affected our results, as well as the 
necessary use of remote data analysis for the blink data. 
 
Slide 21: Maddox 
To address our second question --do novelty seeking and dopamine moderate performance on 
cognitive flexibility tasks?-- we ran two two-way mixed ANOVAs.  
 
First, a two-way mixed ANOVA was performed to determine whether the switch costs for 
learned irrelevance, perseveration, and control task-switching conditions differed as a function of 
dopamine levels. If you look at the graph on this slide, you can see the general patterns of our 
results. The y-axis represents switch cost. The higher the switch cost, the longer the participant 
took to respond to the stimuli after the switch compared to before the switch. The x-axis 
represents the 3 conditions in the cognitive flexibility task. The blue bar represents low EBR (our 
measure for low dopamine levels) and the orange bar represents high EBR (our measure for high 
dopamine levels).  
 
Ultimately, we found that there was a significant main effect for condition. If you look at the 
results for the three conditions on the graph here, you can see that the switch cost for the learned 
irrelevance condition was much higher than in the perseveration or control.  
However, the main effect of dopamine level was not significant (meaning that participants with 
low dopamine and participants with high dopamine did not differ in switch cost overall).  
 
Lastly, and of main interest to our hypothesis, we found that the interaction was not significant. 
We predicted that participants with high dopamine would differ in pattern of responses compared 
to participants with low dopamine. But the non significant interaction effect indicates that 
dopamine level does not make a difference in how an individual performs on the cognitive 
flexibility task. We thought that high dopamine levels would result in individuals having small 
switch costs in the perseveration condition and larger switch costs in the learned irrelevance 
condition (because this response pattern is indicative of cognitive flexibility). If you look at the 
graph, you can see that the pattern of the bars were not even headed in the proper direction for 
our hypothesis.  
 
Slide 22: Brighton 
To address the other half of our second question --do novelty seeking and dopamine moderate 
performance on cognitive flexibility tasks?-- we ran another two-way mixed ANOVAs.  
 
This two-way mixed ANOVA was performed to determine whether the switch costs for learned 
irrelevance, perseveration, and control task-switching conditions differed as a function of novelty 
seeking scores.  
 
Again, if you look at the graph on this slide, you can see the general patterns of our results which 
are similar to the results for the previous ANOVA. The axes are the same on this graph as the 
previous graph. Here, the blue bar represents low novelty seeking and the orange bar represents 
high novelty seeking.  
 
Just as before, we found that there was a significant main effect for condition. This is apparent in 
the graph where you can see that the switch cost for the learned irrelevance condition was much 
higher than in the perseveration or control.  
 
The main effect of novelty seeking was not significant, so participants who scored low on 
novelty seeking and participants who scored high on novelty seeking did not differ in switch cost 
overall). And, again, we found that the interaction effect was not significant which indicates that 
novelty seeking does not make a difference in how an individual performs on the cognitive 
flexibility task.  
 
In terms of our third question which was “Are the performance patterns of cognitively flexible 
individuals better explained by the idea that dopamine creates a novelty bias or that dopamine 
enhances distractor suppression?,” we were unable to draw any conclusions since we did not find 
that dopamine played a part in whether an individual’s pattern of performance reflected cognitive 
flexibility.  
 
Slide 23: Brighton 
Since our data collection was cut short, it is possible that the number of participants from which 
we were able to collect data was simply not enough for us to get reliable data and to see an 
accurate pattern of results. This is most relevant for the dopamine/novelty seeking correlation 
that was in the direction that we predicted but was not quite significant.  
 
It is also possible that the change from our intended blink analysis due to COVID-19 affected our 
results. Originally, we had planned to analyze the blinks using software programmed to 
determine whether a peak met the requirements to qualify as a blink; however, we did not have 
access to this software once we transitioned to remote learning. Because of this limitation, we 
had to visually determine and count how often a participant blinked per minute, which we 
averaged across the five minute recording. This less precise method may have resulted in data 
that was not accurate. 
 
Our data was very noisy which was clear in the error bars on the graphs in the previous slides. 
The standard deviations, relative to the actual mean values, were very large. Based on these 
observations, it is possible that only using the average of the 5 trials before and the average of 
the 5 trials after the switch to determine the switch cost, was not enough to get reliable switch 
cost data (although this was how Dreisbach determined switch cost). However, we ran an 
analysis using switch costs determined by averaging 10 trials before and 10 trials after the 
switch, and that analysis did not provide results with patterns that we predicted either, so that 
does not seem to be the issue here. 
Because the addition of the control condition lengthened the running time for each participant, 
we shortened the length of each condition compared to what Dreisbach did (we changed it from 
40 training trials to 20 and from 20 test trials to 10). This change may have resulted in a 
weakening of the rule switch effect since participants did not have as long in the training 
condition.  
Lastly, it is possible that the addition of the control condition caused the pattern of results to 
alter; however, it seems unlikely that this would be the case. An addition of another condition 
(especially since the arrangement that the conditions were presented to participants was 
counterbalanced) should not alter the pattern of results in this way.  
All of the points are things that could be improved upon in future studies.  
 
Slide 24:  
Thank you for listening. We hope everyone is staying safe and healthy.  
 
